Industrial control systems (ICSs) rely on embedded devices to control essential processes. State-of-theart security solutions can't detect attacks on these devices at the hardware or fi rmware level. To improve ICS cybersecurity, defensive measures should focus on inspectability, trustworthiness, and diversity.
I
ndustrial control systems (ICSs) are used to control physical processes in every industry. In most industries, digital control systems have almost completely replaced the electromechanical relays, manual valves, and levers of the past. Actuators and sensors are wired directly to rugged, embedded computers called eld devices, which communicate over a network with a control center, le ing workers remotely monitor and control physical processes. Figure 1 shows an abstract view of ICS architecture.
For years, security researchers have warned that ICSs are vulnerable to cybera acks and that a successful a ack could have devastating consequences in the physical world. Hundreds of vulnerabilities in the human-machine interface (HMI) and engineering so ware used to program and control these systems have been disclosed (h ps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov /advisories). But, without any strong examples of successful a acks on critical infrastructure, vendors were slow to issue patches and industry lagged in developing a culture of security.
e Stuxnet a ack, publicized in 2010, brought credibility to the security researchers' claims that ICSs were vulnerable targets. 1 Stuxnet signi cantly exceeded the state of the art in ICS exploitation: in addition to launching a sophisticated chain of exploits on the PC-based control so ware, it modi ed the logic running on a programmable logic controller (PLC). 2, 3 Few in the security community had ever considered eld device security before Stuxnet brought it into the common vocabulary.
In the past few years, researchers have begun to analyze these devices and found numerous critical vulnerabilities. Classes of vulnerabilities that have been rare on PCs for more than a decade are common in embedded devices: unauthenticated rmware uploads, debug interfaces le enabled, and hardcoded passwords for backdoor accounts are just a few recurring themes. In the early days of computing, hacking a computer o en meant connecting over the network and asking nicely for what you wanted. Today, many embedded computers that control the electric grid behave similarly.
e new generation of embedded control devices will build on established security practices adapted from general-purpose computing, such as antivirus, intrusion detection systems, and security patching procedures. Although these practices are useful to establish a security baseline, they're not su cient to detect or prevent sophisticated a acks.
Emerging Techniques for Field Device Security
In this article, we review the landscape of control system security-ICS structures, known attacks, and the culture of ICS product design-and examine new defensive measures in terms of inspectability, trustworthiness, and diversity.
Anatomy of a Field Device
Field devices are embedded computers situated in the field (or the factory or transport) that connect directly to actuators and sensors to supervise and control physical processes. Some are "dumb" devices, acting only as a pass-through for an HMI or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system to change settings, whereas others, such as PLCs, exercise local control using programmed logic.
Field devices are also known as remote telemetry units, intelligent electronic devices, programmable automation controllers, real-time automation controllers, substation controllers, and communication processors. Although these devices vary in capability and purpose, we consider them field devices because their hardware and ultimate functions are similar. 4 Figure 2 shows a simplified control system in an electrical substation. A PLC connects to a transformer monitor and a protection relay that controls a breaker. The monitor and relay are wired directly to the transformer and breaker. The PLC has an Ethernet module that lets it communicate over a network-or the Internet-to a central control center.
Most field devices apply commercially available components to custom boards. Their processor architectures vary widely and are similar to those in non-ICS embedded systems. ARM, Power, Motorola 68k, and embedded x86 are all common. Field devices' operating systems range similarly: VxWorks is common, as are embedded Windows and Linux variants. Some devices run in-house, real-time operating systems, but these are becoming less common as embedded systems grow more powerful.
Most deployed field devices implement only rudimentary security features, such as requiring a password to change configuration, and some have no security protections. Many assume that control systems' field devices aren't vulnerable to attack because they're isolated from business networks and the Internet. This is one of the main reasons industry hasn't focused on control system network security. However, the historical isolation is breaking down to meet today's business needs, leaving field devices increasingly vulnerable.
Attacks on Field Devices
Before 2010, the majority of reported ICS vulnerabilities affected PC-based interface and engineering software. When the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) began releasing advisories and alerts about control system vulnerabilities in 2010-shortly before Stuxnet was widely publicized-very few field device-specific Figure 3 shows the total number of ICS-CERT alerts and advisories from 2010 through 2013. By 2013, device-specific vulnerabilities comprised more than half the list.
Stuxnet
Stuxnet was an extremely sophisticated cyberattack, discovered in June 2010. According to many sources, its target was an Iranian uranium enrichment plant. 1, 2 Its goal was to modify the program running on specific PLCs to change centrifuge rotor speeds and damage the rotors, while reporting false values to hide these changes from system operators. 2, 3 Stuxnet used multiple exploits to spread to computers over networks and through thumb drives. Once Stuxnet infected a computer running a Siemens PLC configuration tool, it checked the configuration to confirm that it had reached its target, then modified the logic programming on specific PLCs in that system. [1] [2] [3] The attack's complexity was remarkable because it required multiple skillsets, consumed a large amount of resources, and was very targeted and self-limiting. The attack required in-depth Siemens control system knowledge, process control expertise in the targeted process, and Windows malware development skills with a high degree of quality control. [1] [2] [3] Although the Stuxnet attack was extremely complex, subverting the PLCs was relatively straightforward owing to their design. Currently, many PLCs accept new logic without authentication, don't allow inspection of their state (outside a single vendor-provided tool), and have a static attack surface.
Cultural Matters: Critical Vulnerability or Product Feature?
Prompted by the Stuxnet attack, security researchers analyzed control system field devices in depth and quickly identified many critical vulnerabilities. Frustrated by vendors' slow response to these discoveries, a coalition of researchers released their findings with Project Basecamp in January 2012. 5 They followed up this set of 0-day vulnerabilities targeting field devices with additional Metasploit modules to trivialize exploiting the vulnerabilities. 6 Many of the Project Basecamp 0-day attacks demonstrated that features could be used in malicious ways or that the devices would crash when provided corrupted input. Project Basecamp prompted many security updates, an ICS-CERT alert, 7 and a host of ICS-CERT security advisories-but no sweeping changes in the industry. The fundamental problem is that vulnerabilities are often designed in as features.
For example, many devices include backdoor accounts-often with static, hardcoded passwordsadded intentionally so that engineers or operators can easily perform maintenance and repair activities. Other devices accept firmware upgrades over a network without authentication, even if password authentication is required for normal access. Some devices report sensor values by directly exposing parts of their internal memory but aren't protected against malicious programs that might craft a request to read sensitive parts of memory that hold passwords or other configuration information.
Defending Field Devices
Embedded control system devices are vulnerable to costly and dangerous attacks. Sophisticated attacks might be explained away as mechanical failures-as Stuxnet was at first-unless extensive forensic efforts uncover a cyberattack. Despite this, current control systems' embedded devices aren't monitored for security compromises. State-of-the-art security solutions can't detect attacks on these devices at the hardware or firmware level.
As industry begins to adopt a culture of security, we expect the bar for field device security to rise. However, 
Inspectability
Inspectability-the capability for an external arbiter to monitor a device's internal state-is the backbone of traditional desktop computing security tools. Arbiters observe the behavior, by-products, and code of processes running on the machine. This is how virus scanners identify malware and how integrity checkers identify modifications to a system's important files. Similarly, network intrusion detection requires the ability to inspect network traffic flow. Forensics and reverseengineering tools rely on the ability to inspect source code and binaries both statically and dynamically as they run on a system. Embedded systems are much less inspectable than desktop computers due to lack of tools and suitable interfaces. We hope that interfaces providing real-time inspection will be built into new devices, but inspection capabilities might also be retrofitted for legacy devices through creative use of existing interfaces.
Inspecting Intermodule Communications
Because many field devices comprise modular components connected via a shared backplane, it's sometimes possible to connect to that backplane and inspect intermodule communications. One device that performs this kind of backplane inspection is WeaselBoard. 8 As Figure 4 shows, WeaselBoard connects directly to the PLC backplane and forwards intermodule traffic to an external analysis system. This traffic can be routed through the ICS network, which might be useful for operational monitoring and debugging; however, many security use cases would benefit from a completely out-of-band network connection to receive the forwarded traffic. Software displays the backplane traffic on an analysis workstation. This traffic is similar to network traffic but is based on proprietary physical-layer protocols. The analysis workstation then extracts fields, such as command types and sensor values, at each protocol layer.
WeaselBoard has been used for anomaly detection and forensics, and its unique ability to inspect a PLC's inner workings could be useful for many other applications. For anomaly detection, WeaselBoard tests fields using mechanisms that identify malicious behavior: a rule set and a machine-learning algorithm. The rule set mechanism causes an alert when it sees unexpected behavior and can be customized to process-specific limits. The machinelearning algorithm is a Bayesian classifier trained to alert on traffic symptomatic of known bad states.
Because WeaselBoard raises alerts based on unexpected events in progress, operators can detect attacks that have never before been seen. Other systems raise alerts based on signatures from a catalog of attacks collected and distributed by security vendors. By detecting anomalous events as they occur, asset owners can identify and mitigate or stop attacks before damage occurs.
Inspecting Firmware
Many tools assist security researchers with binary analysis and reverse-engineering for general-purpose computers, but few are available for embedded device firmware analysis. Thus, inspecting device firmware is The first problem that makes firmware analysis harder than general-purpose software analysis is accessibility. Retrieving firmware from a chip can be difficult and costly, especially if the debug interfaces are disabled. Programming devices might be used to read memory contents directly from memory chips that have been desoldered and removed from the device, but even then, the program might be organized or striped across multiple chips in a manner that's difficult to understand.
Once the firmware is collected, researchers can begin using analysis tools, although the data is often obfuscated by hardware configuration or manufacturers' attempts to protect intellectual property. Some tools, such as Binwalk (http://binwalk.org), help unpack firmware; however, this is generally limited to extracting embedded files. IDA Pro, a popular reverse-engineering tool, has added support for numerous embedded architectures but requires users to specify the location of interrupt tables and memory layout, which might not be easily discernible.
Because of the lack of inspectability, much PLC firmware analysis to date has focused on low-hanging fruit, for example, finding hardcoded usernames and passwords that can be extracted by scanning the binary blob for plaintext strings. 5, 9 Researchers have attempted to document and streamline firmware reverse-engineering, 4 but it's still a tedious and expensive process. Some early tools can also detect firmware modification, but these work only for a specific line of PLCs and don't give details about a modification's effects. 10 
Trustworthiness
Some consider trustworthiness the degree to which a system will continue to function correctly and as expected despite disruption, error, or attack. We don't wish to create a new ontology here, nor do we want to limit the discussion; rather, we're most interested in technologies that fundamentally increase our trust in a device. In contrast, inspectability is a mechanism for gaining assurance in a device that we don't trust, and diversity is a mechanism for obscuring the attack surface on a system that might or might not be trustworthy.
Building on a Root of Trust
Trustworthiness-through the use of trusted hardware or software components that provide security functionality (such as encryption) that can be used to ensure other components' security-has been widely explored and implemented in systems such as trusted platform modules (TPMs). Building on a root of trust lets us add trusted components to otherwise untrusted systems. One effort to extend this concept to ICSs is CodeSeal, in which a root of trust is coupled with well-established cryptographic algorithms to securely obfuscate software so adversaries can't reverse-engineer or modify it without attacking the underlying hardware. 11, 12 Although code obfuscation is an active area of academic research, most findings have demonstrated that general obfuscation is impossible. 13 CodeSeal avoids the problem of general obfuscation by modifying the security model to rely on a small tamper-protected device-a trust anchor-which can be implemented as a separate embedded system with its own processor, memory, and I/O channels. Its responsibility is to deobfuscate, authenticate, and securely execute the software in question. CodeSeal has been used to implement trust anchors with field programmable gate arrays, TPM chips, and pure software implementations in a PLC. Figure 5 shows a CodeSeal root of trust protecting a PLC that controls electrical power devices. The obfuscated code is a "security function" that operates inside the PLC. To control the power devices, COTS software calls the security function-an obfuscated binary produced by a special CodeSeal compiler that requires the external trust anchor to operate. Then, the security function communicates with the trust anchor, which performs the de-obfuscation, authentication, and execution of the security function code.
Enhancing Trustworthiness through Defense in Depth
Although basic security features such as firewalls, intrusion detection, encrypted communications, user authentication, and access control can't protect against all ICS threats, a defense-in-depth approach can greatly increase trust in the system. These features can be integrated into new products or added to an existing architecture using "bump in the wire"-style devices, for example, the SEL3620 Security Ethernet Gateway from Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, which provides authentication, secure communications, and logging.
The Open Process Control System Security Architecture for Interoperable Design (OPSAID) program has developed, configured, and laboratory-tested reference implementations of open source security modules that can be built into security appliance devices. 14 OPSAID has accelerated the commercial development and adoption of standard security functions in ICSs that communicate over IP-based networks. The results provide the building blocks for the development of add-on ICS security appliances and a path for the development of ICS end devices with built-in security functionality.
OPSAID exemplifies defense in depth, in which complementary layers of security are combined such that they provide significantly better security than any individual layer. Several devices in the field today implement a subset of OPSAID called Lemnos, which is being formalized as IEEE P2030.102.x standards.
Trust, but (Formally) Verify
Because PLC logic is typically designed by an engineer for a particular installation, it rarely undergoes rigorous code review for correctness or security. Application of rigorous software engineering methodologies and techniques to improve control system trustworthiness is an area of active research, but a considerable gap remains between academic research and application in industry. 15 We expect that industrial automation fields will slowly adopt software engineering best practices, and the overall quality and security of PLC programming will naturally improve. Of particular interest at the device level are efforts to use formal verification in PLC programming. 15, 16 Formal methods are difficult to apply to large codebases, leaving them with a comparatively small niche as static analysis tools in general software engineering workflows. However, because the logic on a PLC is small, specialized to a particular installation, and critical enough to warrant extra analysis, formal methods are practical and valuable here.
Researchers have made several efforts to translate PLC programs to petri nets and other formalisms that are amenable to formal analysis as well as work to perform model checking directly on PLC programs. 15, 16 The approaches that industry will most likely adopt will account for control system engineers' actual workflow. One such approach, intended to integrate into existing workflows, uses a lightweight formal specification procedure that allows for analysis with a model checker. 17 Practical applications of formal methods integrated into control system engineering workflows will give industry more resilient, trustworthy systems by eliminating certain classes of defects.
Diversity
Diversity makes attacks more difficult by reducing the feasible attack surface using adaptive systems and complexity. ICS networks are often built with a static configuration, frequently by engineers without network or application security expertise, and then carefully maintained in that configuration to avoid new problems. Such ICSs are easy to reconnoiter and exploit.
Network Diversity
Researchers have explored security through diversity for general IT systems 18 but haven't applied it to ICS architectures. Security techniques that ICSs can use include dynamic network configuration to resist reconnaissance, code randomization to defeat vulnerability exploits, and code transformation to eliminate unnecessary code paths and their unknown vulnerabilities. Network randomization and dynamic defense techniques mitigate targeted network attacks by reconfiguring network settings automatically and randomizing application communications dynamically. 19 Applying these protective measures could convert ICS networks into moving targets that proactively defend themselves against attack. Managing network reconfigurations, ensuring device connectivity is uninterrupted, and developing response strategies when attacks are detected are necessary measures to successfully randomize and defend ICS networks. The key challenges are: distinguishing users from unauthorized visitors; ensuring adversaries can't reverse-engineer the randomness; and managing dynamic network states, especially during maintenance and emergency repair.
Application Diversity
Exploiting vulnerabilities due to implementation flaws-as opposed to design flaws-usually requires a combination of a known bug and the ability to predict or discover the memory address of needed binary instruction sequences. Loading nearly identical binary code across all installations of an ICS component makes these addresses highly predictable. To reduce the predictability of instruction addresses, desktop and server operating systems routinely employ library address randomization. 20 Ensuring the use of Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is important in ICS components with large memory; however, in many embedded systems, the address space is too small to effectively randomize using standard ASLR techniques. As Richard Wartell and his colleagues demonstrated, near-total address ENERGY CONTROL SYSTEMS SECURITY unpredictability is achievable even in small memory systems with load-time binary stirring-splitting and randomly rearranging the application and libraries using chunks as small as 64 bytes. 21 They also provided a good overview of additional sources of diversity that might thwart an attack.
In the ICS context, we must exercise care when modifying relatively rare but timing-critical instruction sequences. These address diversification techniques reduce bugs' exploitability. Where address randomization is infeasible, we can automatically add an extra argument carrying a secret to important library functions. 22 If the secret is sufficiently complex, remotely staged code injection attacks that assume the standard function signature will likely fail.
Diversity can also help eliminate both known and unknown bugs. ICS components that build on thirdparty libraries are faster to develop, but the components will possess all the features and bugs of those libraries. Whole-program static analysis of the application source or binary code can reveal the library functions and paths that will never be used. Eliminating these paths eliminates the bugs within; however, this diversification and optimization step is rarely taken in the production of ICS firmware and software.
M ost ICS devices are vulnerable to cyberattack. Obscurity, limited connectivity, and the lack of a clear benefit from compromising these systems have left them relatively untouched, but more attacks will likely occur.
The first shift in the industry, currently underway, is to integrate basic security hygiene into products and systems. Regular applications of security patches, antivirus software installation and updates, strict network segregation, and stronger user authentication will go a long way toward protecting industrial control systems from the untargeted malware that's used throughout the Internet. Operations security-limiting the amount of information that potential adversaries can gather about a system or facility-must also play a large role in protecting ICSs. However, we need only look at the example of Stuxnet to see that these basic security practices weren't enough to prevent or even detect certain attacks.
Sophisticated cyberattacks might not target implementation details as typical attacks do. Instead, they might exploit system flaws by violating the assumptions engineers used to build the systems. ICSs are traditionally designed with reliability as the highest priority. They've relied on assumptions about network isolation, proprietary components' and protocols' obscurity, and potential attackers' disinterest.
Future cyberattacks on industrial facilities might consider the plant and control systems in a holistic way, meaning that a fix will require much more than just a security patch. We should take additional steps to improve ICS cybersecurity. Control systems need forensics processes similar to those of desktop PCs. Detection is as important as defense, because knowing when a network is compromised is critical to taking appropriate mitigating actions. In addition, new technologies in the areas of trustworthiness and diversity can harden control system components and make an attacker's work more difficult. 
